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balance sheets at the time of devaluation. Our findings suggest that in Mexico, the 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Mexican tequila crisis of 1994 has posed a puzzle for the traditional explana-
tions of ﬁnancial crises based on macroeconomic imbalances. In 1994 Mexico had
a relatively healthy economy with GDP growth of 4.4% and a ﬁscal deﬁcit and the
current account deﬁcit of 0.1% and 7% of GDP respectively. Nevertheless, the crisis
of 1994-95 involved a peso devaluation of 44% in nominal terms and an increase in
nominal interest rates from 16% in the last quarter of 1994 to 49% in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1995. This led to a substantial decline in GDP in 1995 by 6.2% and a 16.4% fall
in capital investment. Credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP fell from
over 45% of GDP in the last quarter of 1994 to less than 41% in the last quarter of
1995 and further to roughly 20% by 2000.
Four years later, the international price of oil dropped sharply and as an exporter
of oil, the Mexican economy suﬀered a negative shock. Interest rates increased again
and the nominal exchange rate jumped from 8 to 9 pesos per dollar. Although the
consequences of the devaluation were milder than those observed in 1994 and 1995,
economic activity slowed down signiﬁcantly and GDP fell by 1.8% in 1998.
A new view has emerged in the literature, which emphasizes currency mismatches
of assets and liabilities by agents within the economy as the engine for the propagation
of ﬁnancial crisis. According to this view, when a devaluation occurs in the presence
of foreign currency debt, it leads to a dramatic drop in investment. This is what
Krugman (1999) has labeled the “Bernanke-Gertler eﬀect”, referring to the ampliﬁ-
cation of negative shocks due to the combination of capital market imperfections and
weak balance sheets (Bernanke and Gertler 1989). While devaluation improves the
ﬁnancial situation of exporting ﬁrms -the competitiveness eﬀect-, this eﬀect is oﬀset
by the mismatch between foreign-currency liabilities and assets denominated in local
currency, increasing indebtedness of ﬁrms with dollar denominated debt -net-worth
eﬀect-.
Assessing which eﬀect dominates, however, is ultimately an empirical question,
1and it may vary across time and countries. A recent paper that explores the 1994-95
peso crisis by Bleakley and Cowan (2002) investigates the eﬀect of holding foreign-
currency-denominated debt on investment during an exchange rate realignment. Us-
ing a database for over 500 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in 5 Latin American countries -
including Mexico- they ﬁnd that the eﬀect of a devaluation on investment is “con-
sistently” positive. Aguiar (2002), for example, looks at the immediate eﬀect of the
crisis on investment and currency composition of debt in 1995 in Mexico. He ﬁnds
that the immediate eﬀect of the devaluation was to reduce investment for ﬁrms, and
that investment was negatively related to net worth. He also ﬁnds that exporting and
large ﬁrms borrowed mostly in foreign currency. However, the time period on which
this study focuses is limited to the 1994-95 and is not able to exploit any of the panel
characteristics of the data. The author is unable to account for ﬁrm heterogeneity
and longer-term eﬀects of the devaluation. Furthermore, the relationship between
net worth and foreign debt is not statistically signiﬁcant. It is not clear, therefore,
whether the net worth of ﬁrms declined due to the eﬀects of devaluation on their debt
or because of factors related to their fundamentals.
Forbes (2002) also addresses the Mexican experience, although for a diﬀerent pe-
riod. Using a sample of over 13,500 ﬁrms from 42 countries -including Mexico- she
examines the impact of 12 “major depreciations” between 1997 and 2000. Results
suggest that in the year after depreciations, ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly higher growth
in market capitalization (when measured in local currency or US dollars), but sig-
niﬁcantly lower growth in net income (when measured in local currency). Firms
with greater foreign sales exposure have signiﬁcantly better performance. Firms with
higher debt ratios tend to have lower net income growth after devaluations, but there
is no robust relationship between debt levels and other performance variables. Finally,
the author claims that there is no consistent relationship between a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability
or capital/asset ratio and the impact of devaluations on ﬁrm performance.1
1See Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) for a review of the Italian experience.
2In this context, the ﬁrst objective of this paper is to contribute to this debate
studying speciﬁcally the Mexican experience during the 1994-95 peso crisis and on-
wards. Using ﬁrm-level data we examine the role of a currency mismatch in exacer-
bating the negative eﬀects of the 1994 and 1998 devaluations in the corporate sector.
The main diﬀerences between this exercise and existing studies are the following.
First and most important, our data set is a panel just for Mexican ﬁrms, that allows
us to study the evolution of ﬁrms over time and control for ﬁrm heterogeneity, as
opposed to just country eﬀects as in Bleakley & Cowan. Secondly, we do have data
on net sales in foreign currency, so we can actually control for the positive eﬀects of
devaluations and estimate the direct eﬀe c to fd o l l a rd e b to nﬁrms´performance.
In order to better comprehend the overall eﬀects of a devaluation at the ﬁrm level
it is important to understand in the ﬁrst place why domestic ﬁrms borrow in foreign
currency. Despite its prominent role in the aftermath of macroeconomic crises, it
seems that little is known about the precise determinants and consequences of the
currency composition of debt, particularly at the microeconomic level. Economic the-
ory suggests that this can be explained through hedging exchange rate risk. However,
as we shall see later, one puzzle in the Mexican data is why ﬁrms were so imperfectly
hedged before the 1994 crisis. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) set up a model
where the general equilibrium eﬀects of liquidity constraints drive a wedge between
the marginal product of capital and interest rates, and induce ﬁrms to borrow dis-
proportionately in foreign currency.
Aguiar (2002) claims that he found “only weak evidence” to support the standard
hedging model in Mexican ﬁrms, and that it is not necessarily true that ﬁrms allocate
cash ﬂow to states with relatively proﬁtable investment opportunities. Nonetheless,
his results show that exporting and large ﬁrms borrow disproportionately in foreign
currency. Alternatively, Mart´ inez and Werner (2002) suggest that the decision of
borrowing in pesos or dollars highly depends on the exchange rate regime, due the
implicit guarantees given by the government under a ﬁxed exchange regime.
3Along these lines, the second objective of this paper is to investigate what drives
Mexican ﬁrms to borrow in foreign currency. Taking advantage of our data set, we
seek to answer what determined the currency composition and term structure of debt
in Mexican ﬁrms during the 1989-2000 period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data
used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the equations to be estimated, the
empirical methods utilized and the obtained results. Finally, section 4 includes some
concluding remarks and extensions for future research.
2D a t a
The data used in this study comes from the Mexican stock market (Bolsa Mexicana
de Valores or BMV). The data is on yearly basis from 1989 to 2000. While the sample
is restricted to mostly publicly traded ﬁrms and some non-traded ones, this does not
represent a serious limitation for the study. First, this is the only data set of its kind
available in Mexico and provides detailed information on the maturity structure of
debt as well as its currency composition. Second, while small ﬁrms, which are not
listed on the stock market, could probably be exporters, they are not likely to have
access to international capital markets. Our sample, therefore, contains the ﬁrms
where it is most likely to observe currency mismatches.
Each ﬁrm in the sample has an identiﬁer, which allows us to link it across time.
The panel is not balanced and we do observe entry and exit. Exit can take place if a
ﬁrm is de-listed from the stock exchange, or if it merges with another one. In either
case, the BMV removes the ﬁrm from the panel. However, we retain ﬁrms, which are
de-listed in the panel for the entire period for which data is available. For mergers
or other ownership changes, we follow Bleakley & Cowan and aggregate data for all
ﬁrms which participate in a merger into one artiﬁcial ﬁrm throughout the sample
4period.2
Although our full sample includes 378 ﬁrms, only 202 ﬁrms were considered in the
empirical analysis. This follows from the following adjustments. First, we removed
ﬁrms with less than 4 years of data. Second, we did not include ﬁrms, which have
zero capital for one or more years. Third, we eliminated ﬁrms where the investment-
to-capital ratio is beyond the mean +/- 3 standard deviations for that year, for one
of more years. For the GMM estimations we further had to reduce our sample to 196
ﬁrms who had data for at least four consecutive years. Investment for each ﬁrm was
calculated subtracting gross capital at time t+1 from gross capital at time t.3
Table 1 deﬁnes all variables, and Tables 2 to 6 present some features of the adjusted
sample. All data is in real terms, deﬂated by the annual average producer price
index (base year=1994). Table 2 (Figure 1) shows the investment-to-capital ratio for
the whole sample. As can be noticed, this ratio increased moderately from 1989 to
1993, rose sharply in 1992-93 -perhaps due to the positive expectations following the
announcement of NAFTA- and fell dramatically before the crisis, from about 25% to
zero in 1994. This fall in investment might be explained by the change in expectations
due to the Chiapas uprisings at the beginning of 1994 and the assassinations of several
political actors throughout the year. The crisis at the end of 1994 exacerbated this
fall, and investment was only able to recover to its pre 1994 levels by 1997. The
devaluation of 1998 also shows up in a signiﬁcant fall in investment ratios.
Tables 3 and 4 present, respectively, the summary statistics of the proportion
that short-term foreign debt represents of total short-term debt for all ﬁrms and for
exporting ﬁrms. As can be observed (Figure 2) the ratio in both cases increased
gradually in the years leading up to the crisis, increased sharply in 1994 and declined
after both the 1994-95 and 1998 peso devaluations. Under the ﬁxed exchange regime
ﬁrms borrowed heavily in dollars as opposed to pesos, but they switched back to pesos
2We have experimented with other exercises, such as keeping the two merged entities as separate
through the period with almost no change in results.
3Due to data limitations, i.e. many missing observations on investment expenditures, we could
not build up a series of capital stock using the perpetual inventory method.
5after the devaluation and adoption of the ﬂexible exchange rate. Interestingly, this
pattern is more pronounced in exporting ﬁrms, perhaps because these businesses are
the ones with broader access to credit in international markets.
Table 5 (Figure 3) shows the evolution of the ratio of short-term foreign debt to
exports which indicates the degree of currency matching undertaken by ﬁrms. While
in the early 1990s the median of this ratio oscillated around 1.5, it reached a peak of
2.3 in 1994. Apparently, given the favorable expectations following NAFTA, exporters
gained a lot of trust from creditors and borrowed heavily in dollar-denominated lia-
bilities. This left them very vulnerable to exchange rate devaluations. It is interesting
to note also that the introduction of the ﬂoating exchange rate lead ﬁrms to adjust
their currency positions rapidly and from 1996, the median ﬁrm had a ratio of short
term foreign debt to exports of less than 1.
Table 6 shows the diﬀerence in second moments of some ratios between exporters
and non exporters. A weighted average of the variance across time of these ratios
is constructed, with weights proportional to the average of the ratio for the ﬁrm
through this period. This exercise shows that the investment of exporters ﬂuctuated
more than that of non exporters in this period. They also faced at least three times
higher volatility in their earnings. This suggests that exporters operated in a far more
risky environment than non exporters.
Finally Table 7 shows the relation between our sample and some macro aggregates.
The total debt in foreign currency contracted by the ﬁrms in our sample is more than
80 % of the total borrowing abroad by the private sector until the last two years of the
sample, where it falls to about 60%. These ﬁrms also accounted for about 20% of all
exports in this period. These ﬁrms therefore seem like likely candidates to experience
both the positive and negative eﬀects of exchange rate movements.
63 Methodology and Empirical Results
3.1 Investment




















+ ηt + µi + ²it (1)
where ﬁrms are indexed by i and time by t. I and K denote the ﬁrms’ investment
and capital expenditure respectively. D∗ is the amount of debt in foreign currency,
∆logeit is the change in the real exchange rate (deﬁned as the nominal exchange rate
divided by the consumer price index) between time t and t−1a n dD represents total
debt of the ﬁrm. The last three terms are time eﬀects, ﬁrm speciﬁce ﬀects and the
error term respectively. The coeﬃcient γ captures the investment response of holding
dollar debt during a devaluation, whereas δ captures the direct eﬀe c to fd o l l a rd e b t
on investment. In principle, these coeﬃcients could be either positive or negative.
If ﬁrms match the currencies of their inﬂows and outﬂows, a devaluation would be
associated with a simultaneous increase in the value of debt and earnings. If the
increase is expected to be persistant, γ is likely to be positive. On the other hand
for ﬁrms that do not undertake this kind of currency matching, a devaluation is a
negative shock to net worth and, in the presence of capital market frictions, would
aﬀect investment negatively.
The results of this estimation are shown in Tables 8 and 9. The ﬁrst column of
Table 8 replicates the Bleakley & Cowan results using OLS. The speciﬁcation in the
second column is the same as in the ﬁrst with the lagged dependent variable as an
additional independent variable. In both these columns we see that the coeﬃcient
γ is negative, although not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This is in contrast to
the Bleakley & Cowan results which ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relation between
devaluation and investment. The direct inﬂuence of dollar debt on investment is
7also negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in both cases, while the eﬀect of
total debt does not seem to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As expected, the
coeﬃcient on lagged investment ratios is positive. The year dummies show a large
and signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient for 1994-95 and 1998, which were the years in
which substantial devaluations took place. The third column presents the within
estimator. γ is still negative though not statistically signiﬁcant. The direct eﬀect of
dollar debt is still negative and the coeﬃcient of total debt is not signiﬁcant. The
coeﬃcient on lagged investment is negative, but downward biased if the independent
variables are endogenous, i.e. correlated with the ﬁxed eﬀect.
Table 9 presents the GMM diﬀerence and system estimators which accounts for
this endogeneity. The instruments in both cases are one and two period lags of the in-
dependent variables. In both cases the Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying
restrictions, although less strongly for the system estimator. The interesting feature
of the GMM diﬀerence estimator is the negative and signiﬁcant γ which shows that
devaluations seem to have a negative eﬀect on investment. The coeﬃcient on total
debt is also negative, showing evidence of balance sheet eﬀects. However, the direct
eﬀect of dollar debt is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, unlike the other
estimations. This may reﬂect an omitted variable bias, that is, the ability to contract
dollar debt may be an indicator of ﬁrm quality. The coeﬃcient on lagged investment
is positive, and lies within the bounds of the OLS (upward biased) and the Within
Groups (downward biased) estimator. The system estimator for γ is again not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The other coeﬃcients are also quite diﬀerent from the
diﬀerence estimator, the coeﬃcient on dollar debt is negative whereas the coeﬃcient
on total debt is positive. The only robust conclusion from this table is that, contrary
to the results of Bleakley & Cowan, devaluations are not accompanied by an increase
in investment.
Table 10 adds additional controls such as sales and earnings, to equation (1).
The results are still mixed and it is hard to derive any deﬁnite conclusions. γ is not
8signiﬁcant in either of the two estimations. The coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow is positive
and signiﬁcant. Dollar debt is either not signiﬁcant or is negative and signiﬁcant.
If ﬁrms are matching the currency compositions of their revenues and expendi-
tures, the coeﬃcients on dollar debt and dollar debt interacted with the change in
exchange rates may include the eﬀect of devaluations on exports as well, i.e. the
competitiveness eﬀect. Table 11 includes exports and the interaction of exports with
t h ec h a n g ei ne x c h a n g er a t ea si n d e p e n d e n tvariables. The results of this table are
very striking. In both speciﬁcations, as well as with both estimators, the coeﬃcient
on the interaction of dollar debt with the exchange rate is negative and signiﬁcant.
In contrast, the interaction of exports with the exchange rate is positive and signiﬁ-
cant. Dollar debt enters with a negative and strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient and the
coeﬃcients on non-interacted exports is also negative. The latter is probably due to
the higher volatility in the economic environment faced by exporters, as documented
in Table 6, which dampens investment.
Table 12 presents interactions of the dollar debt and exports with yearly dummies
with a within groups, GMM diﬀerence and GMM system estimator. This conﬁrms
what we saw in Table 11 above. In 1994-95 and 1998, holding dollar debt negatively
aﬀected ﬁrms’ investment. It is interesting to see that in years of exchange rate
stability such as 1992 and 1993 the presence of dollar debt allowed ﬁrms to invest far
more than they could have otherwise. In the same years exporters invested heavily
as well. In 1994 and 1995, the coeﬃcient on exports is positive but not signiﬁcant,
perhaps as a response to the general turbulence in that time.
Finally Tables 13 and 14 demonstrate the eﬀects of devaluations on the earnings
of ﬁrms, through its eﬀect on dollar debt and exports. As we would expect, the
coeﬃcient on the interaction of the exchange rate with dollar debt is negative, while
that of the interaction with exports is positive. What is interesting however, is that
the former coeﬃcient is of a much larger magnitude than the latter, suggesting that
the net eﬀect of devaluations on the earnings of a ﬁrm is negative.
9The conclusions from these tables are very clear. Devaluations induce both balance
sheet and competitiveness eﬀects, which in turn aﬀect investment. If we omit variables
that are related to dollar debt and to investment, the coeﬃcient on dollar debt tries to
capture these opposing tendencies and is not robust. However, including exports and
their interaction with exchange rates indicates the presence of a competitiveness eﬀect
and allows us to isolate the balance sheet eﬀect of dollar debt. Interestingly enough,
exporters invested heavily from 1991 through 1993, presumably in anticipation of
NAFTA, but overall their investment was less than non exporting ﬁrms’. Devaluations
aﬀect ﬁrms’ earnings negatively on the balance; increases in export earnings were more
than oﬀset by a decline through the foreign currency debt channel.
3.2 Currency Composition of Debt
The previous section suggests that the holding of foreign currency debt is a channel
for the propogation of exchange rate shocks. A related question therefore is: Why
do ﬁrms hold foreign currency debt? According to economic theory, ﬁrms borrow in
diﬀerent currencies to hedge against risk. Two questions then are: (i) why do ﬁrms
in only some speciﬁc countries tend to follow this pattern, and (ii) why do only some
ﬁrms have access to international markets. Regarding the ﬁrst question, some scholars
claim that emerging markets have a natural tendency for liability dollarization (see
Eichengreen and Hausmann 2000, and Calvo and Reinhart 2000). Other people -like
Mishkin (1996)- tend to believe that the exchange rate regime explains for the most
part why ﬁrms borrow in foreign currency. According to this theory, ﬁrms borrow
more heavily in dollars under a ﬁxed exchange regime, given the implicit guarantee
provided by the government.
A recent paper by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) argues that ﬁrms that are
liquidity constrained are likely to borrow heavily in dollars since in general equilibrium
these constraints drive interest rates below the marginal product of capital. Hence
excessive dollar debt, i.e. inadequate hedging, arises as a somewhat paradoxical result
10of a lack of collateral.
The ﬁrst column of Table 15 presents a probit using an indicator variable whether
the ﬁrm holds any foreign currency debt or not and the second column presents a
tobit with the actual proportion of total debt that is dollar debt. Both estimates
are very similar. Exporters and large ﬁrms tend to hold more foreign debt. We also
use two dummies, one for whether the ﬁrm operates in the tradeables sector and the
o t h e rf o rw h e t h e ri ti s s u e sA m e r i c a nD e p o sitory Reciepts (ADRs) in the U.S. The
former is positive and highly signiﬁcant and the latter is not. Since a large part of
the observations in our data were non zero (1255 out of 1418), we also decided to
remove the zero observations and use a transformation of the ratio of dollar debt
to total debt as the dependent variable. The results are in Table 16. The ﬁrst
two columns show OLS and within groups estimators, the results of which are very
similar to the previous ones. The coeﬃcient on exports and ﬁrm size-proxied by
ﬁxed capital- are consistently positive and signiﬁcant across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
These results are consistent with previous evidence4 and conﬁrm the hypothesis that
big ﬁrms and/or exporters, i.e. ﬁrms with collateral, are more likely to borrow in
foreign currency. With the GMM diﬀerence estimator, the coeﬃcient on exports is
no longer signiﬁcant, however the system estimates are very similar to the within
groups and the OLS estimator.5 Finally Table 17 presents the same estimators using
lagged dependent variables as well. Somewhat surprisingly the coeﬃcient on exports
is negative and signiﬁcant with the diﬀerence estimator but the system estimator is
unchanged.
3.3 Economic Eﬀects of a Devaluation
Given our estimations, a relevant question is: how large were the eﬀects of the de-
valuation? In other words, although the coeﬀecients of interest have the right signs
4See for example Mart´ inez and Werner (2002) and Aguiar (2002).
5Notice that we cannot use the tradeables dummies or the ADR dummy in any regression which
accounts for ﬁrm heterogeneity because these variables do not change over time.
11and are statistically signiﬁcant, were the quantitative eﬀects of the devaluation large
enough to merit our attention? The answer to this question is given in Figure 4. Us-
ing the estimates from the ﬁrst two columns of Table 11 we compute the eﬀect of a 1%
devaluation on investment. In this speciﬁcation, the eﬀect of the change in exchange
rate on investment is mediated through two opposing forces: a balance sheet eﬀect
through the holding of foreign currency denominated debt, and a competitiveness
eﬀect through exports. Although the coeﬃcients on the two terms are not very diﬀer-
ent, the imperfect hedging in the years up to the 1994 crisis would lead us to expect
that the balance sheet eﬀect would predominate. Figure 4 shows the yearly net eﬀect










evaluated at the total D∗
t−1/Kt−1 and Xt−1/Kt−1 for all ﬁrms and ∆loget in that
year. The solid line represents the net eﬀe c tb a s e do nt h eG M Md i ﬀerence estimator
and the dashed line is the estimate from the GMM system estimator, i.e. the ﬁrst two
columns of Table 11. The eﬀects of devaluation vary over time. In the period before
1994, even though ﬁrms were imperfectly hedged (i.e. the term inside the brackets
was negative), the real exchange rate appreciated which implied positive real eﬀects
on investment between 5 and 8% in 1992, and between 8% and 13% in 1993. In
other words, the real appreciation of the exchange rate beneﬁtted holders of foreign
currency debt and outweighed the negative eﬀects on exports. The devaluation of
1994 triggered a signiﬁcant fall in investment of about 5 to 7% in 1994 and, more
dramatically, more than 50% in 1995. It is interesting to note that the recovery in
1996 and 1997 was quite pronounced, partly as a result of better hedging (see for ex-
ample, Table 5) where ﬁrms matched exports and foreign currency debt to a greater
degree, and partly due to a relatively steady exchange rate. The 1998 devaluation
produced only a small fall in investment of about 0.6% given that ﬁrms were much
better hedged than they were in 1994.
We can therefore conclude that the balance sheet eﬀects of the 1994 devaluation
were extremely large and completely dominated the competitiveness eﬀects due to
12imperfect hedging brought about by ﬁxed exchange rates. In 1998, while the balance
sheet eﬀect of the devaluation dominated the competitiveness eﬀect, the net eﬀect
was small, due to (i) the relatively smaller depreciation of the real exchange rate and
(ii) the debt portfolio adjustment ﬁr m sw e r ef o r c e dt om a k ei naﬂoating exchange
rate regime.
4 Conclusions
In the context of a highly globalized world with almost no barriers in international
ﬁnancial markets it is not surprising to observe countries borrowing in diﬀerent cur-
rencies to hedge against risk. What is interesting is that this process is no longer
exclusive to governments and today is also common among private ﬁrms.
Recent economic literature has addressed the topic of multiple currency borrowing
from various perspectives. At the microeconomic level, scholars have concentrated
their attention on explaining two questions: i) why ﬁrms tend to borrow in currencies
other than the domestic, and ii) what is the impact of a devaluation on private
investment in the presence of foreign currency denominated debt. This paper provides
some empirical evidence for the Mexican experience in the last decade.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. Large ﬁrms and export-oriented ﬁrms in the
tradeable sector tend to borrow more heavily in foreign currency. The presence of
foreign currency debt poses a signiﬁcant risk to balance sheets at the time of devalu-
ation. Our ﬁndings suggest that in Mexico, the balance sheet eﬀects of a devaluation
outweigh the competitiveness eﬀects. In standard investment equations we ﬁnd that
foreign debt as well as the interaction of foreign debt with changes in exchange rates
are negatively correlated with investment. The other interesting ﬁnding is that depre-
ciations induce exporters to invest, i.e. we have some evidence of a competitiveness
eﬀect. However, in general, exports are negatively correlated with investment. There
is some evidence that the investment and earnings of exporters are far more volatile
13than those of non exporters which may be the reason behind this negative sign. An-
other interesting result is that apparently in the years leading to the crises, ﬁrms
positioned themselves in a way which rendered them particularly vulnerable to the
adverse eﬀects of a devaluation. Firms with high amounts of dollar denominated
liabilities and exports invested substantially before the crisis. These were also the
ﬁrms most aﬀe c t e db yt h ee x c h a n g er a t es h o c k ,a si sr e ﬂe c t e di nt h e i ri n v e s t m e n t
performance.
We also quantify the eﬀects of devaluations on ﬁrm investment. The 1994 deval-
uation was associated with a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on investment which was a
combination of inadequate hedging and a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate. In
contrast, the 1998 devaluation, which was substantially smaller, had a more modest
eﬀect on investment due to better hedging
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Figure 4: Total Eﬀect of Devaluation on Investment
17Table 1: Deﬁnitions of Variables
D Total debt
D∗ Total dollar debt
X Total exports
EBITDA Earnings before accrued interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization
Sales Total sales (domestic and exports)
∆loget Change in the (log of) real exchange rate
between time t and t − 1
Table 2: Investment/Capital
Year No of Firms Mean Median Std Deviation
1989 60 0.0428 0.0064 0.1425
1990 127 0.0668 0.0361 0.1699
1991 150 0.0665 0.0344 0.1683
1992 162 0.0894 0.0410 0.1695
1993 167 0.2632 0.2306 0.2735
1994 147 0.0098 0.0060 0.1484
1995 137 -0.0392 -0.0599 0.1259
1996 134 0.0343 0.0242 0.1671
1997 128 0.0806 0.0550 0.1362
1998 113 -0.0167 -0.0090 0.1531
1999 94 0.0120 0.0036 0.0966
18Table 3: Ratio of Short Term Foreign Debt to Total Short Term Debt for all ﬁrms
Year No of Firms Mean Median Std. Deviation
1989 60 0.2475 0.2143 0.2316
1990 127 0.2873 0.2208 0.2655
1991 150 0.3184 0.2807 0.2881
1992 164 0.3053 0.2451 0.2821
1993 175 0.3183 0.3017 0.2621
1994 169 0.3886 0.3930 0.2947
1995 158 0.4220 0.4268 0.3001
1996 152 0.3583 0.3466 0.2828
1997 137 0.3548 0.3524 0.2781
1998 127 0.3711 0.3839 0.2858
1999 113 0.3251 0.3146 0.2639
2000 95 0.3458 0.3331 0.2858
Table 4: Short Term Foreign Debt/Short Term Debt (Exporters)
Year No of Firms Mean Median Std Deviation
1989 45 0.2907 0.2774 0.2188
1990 80 0.3908 0.4054 0.2417
1991 94 0.4254 0.4263 0.2576
1992 103 0.4116 0.4174 0.2621
1993 107 0.4106 0.4026 0.2384
1994 105 0.5139 0.5569 0.2579
1995 109 0.5071 0.5580 0.2741
1996 108 0.4319 0.4304 0.2681
1997 92 0.4691 0.5274 0.2516
1998 86 0.4764 0.5338 0.2543
1999 82 0.3840 0.3660 0.2562
2000 68 0.4299 0.4351 0.2807
19Table 5: Short Term Foreign Debt/Exports
Year No of Firms Mean Median Std Deviation
1989 45 1.6093 0.6473 3.9902
1990 80 3.3812 1.2727 7.1595
1991 94 5.8081 1.6193 18.1250
1992 104 5.8649 1.7026 12.6269
1993 107 5.9134 1.8778 11.7592
1994 105 50.9801 2.3347 366.5397
1995 109 13.8450 1.2637 67.5086
1996 108 4.8988 0.8511 16.4119
1997 92 7.6851 0.8093 32.1631
1998 86 6.9136 0.8750 18.2148
1999 85 11.0444 0.7279 50.2445
2000 77 18.2304 0.7747 132.2806










Max 0.232 0.074 0.296 0.205
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median 0.020 0.003 0.002 0.014
Average 0.031 0.006 0.009 0.027
Weighted average∗ 0.071 0.022 0.113 0.074
Non Exporters (98 ﬁrms)
Max 0.203 0.028 0.093 0.932
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median 0.024 0.002 0.000 0.019
Average 0.035 0.004 0.004 0.056
Weighted average∗ 0.065 0.007 0.029 0.310
Exporters2 (69 ﬁrms)
Max 0.232 0.074 0.296 0.181
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median 0.022 0.003 0.002 0.012
Average 0.032 0.006 0.102 0.023
Weighted average∗ 0.080 0.022 0.134 0.000
Non Exporters (127 ﬁrms)
Max 0.203 0.051 0.093 0.932
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median 0.024 0.003 0.001 0.019
Average 0.035 0.005 0.004 0.053
Weighted average∗ 0.074 0.016 0.037 0.330
1 At least one year with Exports/Sales greater than or equal to 0.10.
2 At least one year with Exports/Sales greater than or equal to 0.20.
∗ Weights are equal to the proportion that the average of each ratio represents of
the total.
21Table 7: Sample Statistics as a Percentage of Macro Aggregates
Year Foreign Debt Total Debt Exports
1989 n.a. n.a. 13
1990 n.a. n.a. 18
1991 n.a. n.a. 17
1992 n.a. n.a. 16
1993 n.a. n.a. 19
1994 86 37 20
1995 80 39 23
1996 88 44 20
1997 86 48 18
1998 67 48 15
1999 51 47 14
Source: Banco de Mexico. Exports do not include petroleum. Both columns of debt
are private sector debt.
Table 8: Investment Equation :I
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−1
OLS (1) OLS (2) Within Groups
Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ.S t d . E r r o r Coeﬀ.S t d . E r r o r
Constant 0.029* 0.013 0.030* 0.012
It−1
Kt−2 0.184* 0.043 -0.067 0.036
D∗
t−1
Kt−1∆loget -0.008 0.090 -0.049 0.090 -0.034 0.088
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 -0.061* 0.023 -0.047* 0.022 -0.196* 0.062
Dt−1
Kt−1 0.013 0.012 0.003 0.011 0.037 0.037
D91 0.026 0.025 0.020 0.024 0.095* 0.027
D92 0.046 0.019 0.037* 0.018 0.111* 0.021
D93 0.231* 0.027 0.216* 0.027 0.292* 0.026
D94 -0.030 0.018 -0.084* 0.019 0.036 0.022
D95 -0.064* 0.021 -0.063* 0.020 -0.020 0.020
D96 0.008 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.041* 0.017
D97 0.055* 0.016 0.049* 0.015 0.068* 0.014
D98 -0.025 0.018 -0.038* 0.017 -0.013 0.015
R2 0.274 0.302 0.508
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
22Table 9: Investment Equations: II
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−1
GMM Diﬀerence GMM Systems
Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Constant -0.027 0.018 0.053* 0.013
It−1
Kt−2 0.119* 0.022 0.151* 0.014
D∗
t−1
Kt−1∆loget -0.086* 0.041 0.011 0.018
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 0.327* 0.084 -0.069* 0.006
Dt−1
Kt−1 -0.095* 0.030 0.016* 0.003
D92 0.021 0.013
D93 0.206* 0.029 0.221* 0.019
D94 -0.293* 0.026 -0.108* 0.015
D95 0.003 0.022 -0.099* 0.014
D96 0.088* 0.023 -0.016 0.015
D97 0.063* 0.022 0.009 0.014
D98 -0.037 0.023 -0.068* 0.015





Instruments t-2 & t-3 lags t-2 & t-3 lags
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p values for the
null hypothesis of no ﬁrst order and second order serial correlation respectively.
23Table 10: Investment Equations: III
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−1
GMM Diﬀerence GMM System
Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Constant -0.002 0.014 0.060* 0.004
It−1
Kt−2 0.135* 0.015 0.144* 0.003
D∗
t−1
Kt−1∆loget -0.021 0.018 0.024* 0.004
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 0.027 0.024 -0.050* 0.002
Dt−1
Kt−1 0.000 0.009 0.004* 0.001
Salest
Kt−1 -0.024 0.032 0.001* 0.000
EBITDAt
Kt−1 0.037* 0.015 0.056* 0.001
D92 0.023* 0.004
D93 0.211* 0.023 0.221* 0.006
D94 -0.333* 0.018 -0.115* 0.004
D95 -0.014 0.017 -0.110* 0.004
D96 0.077* 0.016 -0.019* 0.004
D97 0.034* 0.016 0.001 0.004
D98 -0.080* 0.017 -0.088* 0.004













t - 1a n dt - 2l a g sf o rS a l e sa n dE B I T D A )
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p values for the
null hypothesis of no ﬁrst order and second order serial correlation respectively.
24Table 11: Investment Equation: IV
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−1
GMM Diﬀerence GMM System GMM Diﬀerence GMM System
Coeﬀ Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Constant 0.226* 0.017 0.064* 0.006 0.219* 0.024 0.059* 0.010
It−1
Kt−2 0.120* 0.019 0.210* 0.005 0.156* 0.023 0.214* 0.010
D∗
t−1
Kt−1∆loget -0.121* 0.035 -0.071* 0.012 -0.146* 0.039 -0.032 0.019
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 -0.178* 0.030 -0.052* 0.004 -0.179* 0.042 -0.083* 0.005
Dt−1
Kt−1 0.050* 0.016 0.011* 0.002 0.067* 0.020 0.023* 0.002
Xt−1
Kt−1∆loget 0.150* 0.051 0.072* 0.014 0.114* 0.057 0.109* 0.024
Xt−1
Kt−1 -0.277* 0.036 -0.040* 0.004 -0.246* 0.049 -0.001 0.006
EBITDAt
Kt−1 0.021 0.026 0.066* 0.002
D93 0.211* 0.008 0.228* 0.014
D94 -0.551* 0.026 -0.130* 0.006 -0.548* 0.036 -0.131* 0.011
D95 -0.219* 0.022 -0.101* 0.007 -0.195* 0.029 -0.106* 0.010
D96 -0.157* 0.022 -0.028* 0.006 -0.156* 0.029 -0.022* 0.011
D97 -0.186* 0.019 -0.011 0.006 -0.184* 0.026 0.002 0.010
D98 -0.305* 0.021 -0.098* 0.006 -0.293* 0.028 -0.092* 0.010
D99 -0.199* 0.019 -0.060* 0.006 -0.193* 0.026 -0.055* 0.010
Sargan 72.237 111.037 57.689 90.978
p-value 0.176 0.233 0.185 0.189
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.488
AR2 0.229 0.481 0.356










t-1 and t-2 lags for EBITDA
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p values for the
null hypothesis of no ﬁrst order and second order serial correlation respectively.
25Table 12: Investment Equation: V
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−1
Within Groups GMM Diﬀerence GMM System
Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
It−1
Kt−2 0.122* 0.042 0.109* 0.005
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 -0.125* 0.033 0.078 0.101 -0.027* 0.003
Xt
Kt−1 -0.215* 0.090 -0.222 0.320 -0.008 0.012
EBITDAt
Kt−1 -0.044 0.047 -0.013 0.060 0.036* 0.003
Salest
Kt−1 0.028* 0.010 -0.006 0.016 0.006* 0.000
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 ∗ D91 0.009 0.198 -0.375 0.260 -0.261* 0.049
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 ∗ D92 0.251 0.132 0.178 0.160 0.216* 0.020
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 ∗ D93 0.499* 0.164 0.582* 0.139 0.832* 0.042
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 ∗ D94 -0.114* 0.084 -0.154 0.106 -0.122* 0.016
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 ∗ D95 -0.102 0.066 -0.048 0.091 -0.037* 0.008
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 ∗ D96 -0.023 0.083 0.004 0.077 0.015* 0.007
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 ∗ D97 -0.010 0.050 0.027 0.078 0.059* 0.006
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 ∗ D98 -0.109* 0.039 -0.099 0.074 -0.086* 0.004
Xt−1
Kt−1 ∗ D91 0.387* 0.181 1.201* 0.427 0.909* 0.075
Xt−1
Kt−1 ∗ D92 0.007 0.141 0.387 0.291 0.050 0.040
Xt−1
Kt−1 ∗ D93 0.676* 0.255 1.083* 0.301 0.455* 0.078
Xt−1
Kt−1 ∗ D94 0.156 0.106 0.206 0.213 0.002 0.028
Xt−1
Kt−1 ∗ D95 0.113 0.125 0.018 0.203 -0.092* 0.015
Xt−1
Kt−1 ∗ D96 0.158 0.120 0.120 0.191 0.030* 0.014
Xt−1
Kt−1 ∗ D97 0.236* 0.080 0.166 0.183 0.068* 0.020
Xt−1






Instruments t-2 t-3 lags for all variables
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p values for the
null hypothesis of no ﬁrst order and second order serial correlation respectively.
26Table 13: EBITDAt
Kt−1 : Within Groups Estimator
Dependent Variable: EBITDAt
Kt−1
Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
D∗
t−1
Kt−1∆loget -0.298* 0.093 -0.626* 0.110
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 -0.295 0.155 -0.320 0.156
Dt−1





D91 0.015 0.023 0.015 0.022
D92 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.019
D93 0.008 0.020 0.009 0.019
D94 -0.062* 0.021 -0.061* 0.020
D95 0.012 0.026 0.014 0.026
D96 0.026 0.020 0.021 0.018
D97 0.009 0.022 0.004 0.021
D98 -0.033 0.028 -0.040 0.030
R2 0.829 0.834
* denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
27Table 14: EBITDAt
Kt−1 :G M MD i ﬀerence and System Estimator
GMM Diﬀerence Estimator GMM System Estimator
Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Constant 0.012* 0.009 0.014* 0.007 0.084* 0.008 0.065* 0.009
D∗
t−1
Kt−1∆loget -0.400* 0.032 -0.523* 0.034 -0.141* 0.024 -0.540* 0.031
D∗
t−1
Kt−1 -0.773* 0.048 -0.611* 0.023 -0.501* 0.016 -0.691* 0.018
Dt−1
Kt−1 0.332* 0.021 0.251* 0.010 0.216* 0.007 0.251* 0.008
Xt−1
Kt−1∆loget 0.136* 0.038 0.094* 0.032
Xt−1
Kt−1 0.418* 0.014 0.520* 0.016
D92 -0.019* 0.006 0.001 0.006
D93 -0.022 0.013 -0.022* 0.008 -0.021* 0.007 -0.004 0.008
D94 -0.066* 0.012 -0.072* 0.009 -0.091* 0.008 -0.072* 0.008
D95 0.073* 0.015 0.061* 0.009 -0.015* 0.007 0.022* 0.009
D96 -0.001 0.011 -0.019* 0.007 0.044* 0.008 0.019* 0.009
D97 -0.023* 0.010 -0.030* 0.008 0.021* 0.008 -0.010 0.010
D98 -0.047* 0.012 -0.059* 0.008 -0.033* 0.008 -0.065* 0.011
D99 0.007 0.010 0.026* 0.007 -0.001 0.009 -0.018* 0.009
Sargan 63.904 86.499 85.227 81.374
p-value 0.145 0.264 0.066 0.070
AR1 0.096 0.095 0.070 0.099
AR2 0.595 0.781 0.807 0.759








Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p values for the null hypothesis
of no ﬁrst order and second order serial correlation respectively.




Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Xt−1
Salest−1 2.430* 0.549 0.727* 0.044
logKt−1 0.137* 0.020 0.034* 0.002
ADR Dummy 0.250 0.147 0.041* 0.019
Tradeable Dummy 0.609* 0.104 0.063* 0.015
D90 -1.150* 0.323 -0.240* 0.045
D91 -1.133* 0.269 -0.212* 0.036
D92 -1.154* 0.262 -0.188* 0.035
D93 -0.865* 0.265 -0.155* 0.034
D94 -0.845* 0.262 -0.091* 0.033
D95 -0.615* 0.283 -0.127* 0.034
D96 -0.809* 0.275 -0.141* 0.035
D97 -0.839* 0.271 -0.119* 0.035
D98 -0.711* 0.279 -0.107* 0.035
D99 -0.755* 0.284 -0.138* 0.036
σ 0.276* 0.006
Log L -392.255 -327.599
No. of Obs. 1418 1418
The ADR dummy and the tradeable dummy take the value 1 for ﬁrms that issue ADRs
and are in the tradeables sector respectively. σ refers to the standard deviation of
the error term.








OLS Within Groups GMM Diﬀerence GMM System
Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Constant -5.505* 0.384 0.187 0.129 -4.344* 0.477
Xt−1
Salest−1 3.733* 0.279 1.348* 0.367 -1.792 1.108 3.814* 0.352
logKt−1 0.346* 0.028 0.581* 0.243 1.311* 0.546 0.288 0.039
ADR Dummy 0.060 0.113
Tradeables 0.449* 0.102
D1990 -0.318 0.235 -0.163 0.208
D1991 -0.222 0.240 -0.034 0.207
D1992 0.009 0.232 0.231 0.213 0.063 0.102
D1993 0.062 0.221 0.357 0.183 -0.078 0.177 0.245* 0.099
D1994 0.460* 0.226 0.765* 0.180 0.157 0.154 0.550* 0.108
D1995 0.131 0.222 0.585* 0.165 -0.399 0.199 0.473* 0.108
D1996 -0.010 0.239 0.349 0.177 -0.208 0.208 -0.049 0.132
D1997 0.118 0.251 0.288 0.179 -0.137 0.153 0.092 0.144
D1998 0.265 0.243 0.374* 0.156 -0.122 0.158 0.224 0.130
D1999 0.063 0.251 0.102 0.130 -0.578* 0.148 -0.027 0.141
D2000 -0.240 0.159 -0.068 0.141
R2 0.339 0.750
No. of obs 1255 1255 873 1047
Sargan 30.212 53.493
pv a l u e 0.607 0.417
AR(1) 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.081 0.070
Instruments t-2 and t-3 lags of exports and capital stock
Note: The ADR dummy and the tradeables dummy take the value 1 for ﬁrms that issue ADRs and
are in the tradeables sector respectively. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are
the p values for the null hypothesis of no ﬁrst order and second order serial correlation respectively.








GMM Diﬀerence GMM System
Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ.S t d . E r r o r








0.334* 0.047 0.761* 0.015
Xt−1
Salest−1 -2.188* 0.805 0.992* 0.120
logKt−1 0.985* 0.448 0.051* 0.014
D1992 -0.037 0.098
D1993 0.158 0.158 -0.038 0.102
D1994 0.279 0.136 0.108 0.088
D1995 -0.222 0.160 -0.059 0.087
D1996 0.062 0.162 -0.404* 0.099
D1997 0.166 0.142 -0.097 0.101
D1998 0.099 0.141 -0.083 0.089
D1999 -0.341* 0.121 -0.394* 0.098






Instruments t-2 and t-3 lags of exports and capital stock
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p values for the
null hypothesis of no ﬁrst order and second order serial correlation respectively.
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